From Silence to Condemnation
The Helsinki Statement of the European Churches on the Russian World Ideology
Dr. Paul Gavrilyuk
Aquinas Chair in Theology and Philosophy at the University of St. Thomas (St. Paul, MN)
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian World (Russkii mir) doctrine has been extensively scrutinized and debated on Public Orthodoxy. As evidenced by public events and publications, a robust scholarly critique of this doctrine has not been lacking. A few influential church leaders have strongly criticized the Russian Orthodox Church’s collusion with the state in justifying and promoting the war. However, a determined collective response of churches and church leaders—both Orthodox and non-Orthodox—to the Russian World doctrine has been missing so far.[1]
Against this background, a recently released “Statement on the Russian World Ideology” could be a game-changer. The Statement was produced by an ecumenical group of church leaders, officers, and scholars at a conference in Helsinki on December 1-3, 2025. The conference, “Resisting Empire, Promoting Peace: Churches Confront the ‘Russian World’ Ideology,” was organized by an ecumenical team led by Katerina Pekridou, an Orthodox theologian who runs the Pathways to Peace Initiative of the Conference of European Churches (CEC). This ecumenical organization serves 114 member churches in Europe, including several local Orthodox Churches. The Pathways to Peace Initiative currently focuses on a response of the European churches to the war in Ukraine.
The Helsinki Statement is intended as a concise and practical resource for churches across Europe. The Statement explains what the Russian World ideology is, why it is theologically problematic, and how the churches should act in the present circumstances. Addressing the first point, the document states: “The ‘Russian World’ ideology denies the national identity of Ukrainians and neighbouring nations, as well as their right to self-determination. Drawing on a dualistic worldview, it portrays the West—with its emphasis on human rights, democracy, liberalism, gender equality and individual autonomy—as an evil to be resisted by Russia in the so-called ‘metaphysical battle’, for the ‘traditional values’, which Russia is allegedly defending.” The central tenets of the Russian World ideology are laid down in a manner that is direct and lapidary.
Addressing the theologically problematic aspects of the Russian World ideology, the Helsinki Statement asserts: “Let us be clear: The claim that a soldier’s death in the line of duty automatically cleanses sins, framing it as a sacrificial act, is heretical, just as describing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a ‘holy war’ and portraying Russia as a ‘katechon state’—a force restraining global evil—are heretical.” The expression “katechon state” is an allusion to the “restrainer (katechon) of the power of lawlessness” mentioned in 2 Thessalonians 2:6-7. According to the Russian World doctrine, the role of this biblical “restrainer” belongs to the Russian state as personified by the Russian ruler.[2]
The use of the term “heresy” for the Russian World ideology is highly unusual in an official ecumenical document. The drafters of the Helsinki Statement could have avoided the term “heresy,” but instead they deliberately chose to emphasize it. While some may contest the applicability of the term to the Russian World teaching for various reasons, none of these reasons is compelling.[3] The Russian World teaching is a post-modern hybrid: a state policy, an ideology of expansionism, a form of cultural chauvinism, a false prophecy, and a heresy all-in-one. The Helsinki Statement’s bold language is refreshing, especially in application to a teaching held by the leadership of the most numerous local Orthodox Church, which is used to treating the teachings of other Christian groups as heretical.
The Helsinki Statement goes on to point out, without mincing words, that “the ‘Russian World’ ideology preaches hatred and war instead of the love of Christ and peace.” At the heart of it, is the displacement of the triune God and Christ with the “triune nation” and “traditional values.” The Statement subsequently calls the churches to put Christ into the center, which is explained in terms of participation in the Lord’s threefold ministry of prophet, priest, and king.
The final section of the Helsinki Statement features concrete recommendations for churches and individual Christians. The first recommendation is to “strengthen Ukrainian resistance to the Russian world ideology and its devastating consequences.” The consequences for Ukraine have indeed been deadly. According to Vladimir Putin, during its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia “relied on those who considered themselves a part of the large Russian World, those who considered themselves a part of our culture, our linguistic milieu, considered themselves a part of our common traditions.” However one interprets this ominous remark, it is clear that the resistance to the Russian World ideology is crucial for Ukraine’s very survival as a sovereign nation.
Other recommendations include a) challenging the misuse of faith by the Orthodox and other churches in Russia; b) offering hospitality to refugees and those displaced by war; c) encouraging the collection and preservation of testimonies of survivors; d) interceding for Ukrainian children illegally deported to Russia. It should be noted that the Ukrainian children who become victims of illegal deportation to Russia typically lose their Ukrainian identity through “re-education” and are in many cases subjected to militarization. In other words, these children are trained to fight in Russia’s present and future wars, including the ongoing war against their own country of birth, Ukraine. According to the Geneva Convention, such identity erasure constitutes a crime against humanity and is a form of genocide.
The Russian state is waging a long-term war, which may perhaps last longer than WWII. Given the inconsistent and fickle nature of the US government’s policy regarding the war in Ukraine, it is important to be clear-sighted about the Russian state’s aims in Ukraine. The ultimate aim of the Russian state is to destroy Ukraine’s statehood by all means at its disposal, whether material, such as shells and drones, or ideological, such as the de-humanization of Ukrainians and the erasure of their national identity. The Russian World doctrine is the Russian state’s major ideological weapon, manufactured in the bosom of the Russian Orthodox Church. The main value of the Helsinki Statement is in articulating the dangers of this weapon clearly and accessibly.
Since the Russian Orthodox Church exited CEC in 2008, it cannot muffle the voice of the Ukrainian church leaders within the organization, as it does elsewhere. On the contrary, the voice of Ukrainian churches, and, what is more important, the voice of the victims of this horrific war, sounds loud and clear. For this reason, the Helsinki Statement is a landmark ecumenical achievement. Remarkably, under the influence of the Helsinki Statement, Jerry Pillay, the General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, issued a statement that for the first time in WCC’s history identified the Russian World ideology by name and stated that it “represents a great obstacle to a just and sustainable peace.” Would the church leaders in Europe and worldwide have ears to hear?
[1] The first significant collective response was “A Declaration on the Russian World (Russkii mir) Teaching,” which included over 1,200 signatories; the second collective response was by the Bishop’s Synod of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and was based, in part, on the Declaration. See Metropolitan Epiphany’s Letter to Patriarch Bartholomew, July 27, 2022.
[2] This point was considered important enough to be included in a policy document “The Present and Future of the Russian World,” ratified by the World Russian People’s Council in March 2024. For further discussion, see my Public Orthodoxy article “When Theology Fuels the War.”
[3] For the consideration of the relevant arguments, see my “When the Patriarch of Moscow Blesses a War: The Russian World and the Sacralization of Violence,” Modern Theology 41:3 (July 2025), 406-421.