Στις 7 Αυγούστου 2021 πραγματοποιήθηκε μια διεθνής διαδικτυακή συνάντηση για τις σχέσεις Ρωσίας-Ουκρανίας και τις επιπτώσεις τους στην παγκόσμια Ορθοδοξία και πέραν αυτής.
Παραθέτουμε στη συνέχεια την σύντομη αλλά και καίρια εισήγηση του Ομ. Καθηγητού της Θεολογικής Σχολής του Α.Π.Θ. Πέτρου Βασιλειάδη, με θέμα:
ΠΡΩΤΕΙΟ ΚΑΙ ΑΡΝΗΤΙΚΗ ΤΑΥΤΟΤΗΤΑ ΤΑ ΑΙΤΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΟΥΚΡΑΝΟΡΩΣΙΚΗΣ ΔΙΕΝΕΞΗΣ
“The Predicaments for Orthodox Ecclesiology of Its Negative Identity, and the New Era After Ukrainian Autocephaly”In this panel that will examine the implications of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict for Orthodox relations inside Ukraine and for the Orthodox unity at the international scene, on my part, I will focus on its real cause, especially in regard to the authentic Orthodox ecclesiology.It is my firm conviction that the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew’s primary task all these years was to bring into completion, after nearly 70 years of preparation, a Panorthodox Synod. It was for that reason that he avoided taking any initiative to heal the painful schism within Ukraine – despite numerous requests from various quarters οf that country, although he considered its ecclesiastical structure as belonging to his jurisdiction.
My CEMES foundation dealt with all these issues from canonical, historical and theological perspectives and found that the Synodical and Patriarchal decision to grant autocephaly to a united Ukrainian Church was taken according to all canonical preconditions, [1] despite being strongly and vehemently opposed by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), to the extent that she eventually broke Eucharistic communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate (EP)[2].
Ever since, a thorough critical examination of the situation, which is further deteriorated, has convinced me that the real causes of this regrettable situation are much more serious. What lies behind this crisis is the dispute on an effective primacy role to deal with inter-Orthodox secondary, mostly administrative, issues, because of the Russian Orthodox Church’s refusal to accept the ages-old canonical and ecumenically decreed prerogatives of the Ecumenical Patriarch. Unfortunately, for many centuries, especially in the second half of the second millennium, we Orthodox have unconsciously developed a “negative” Orthodox identity: we are not what the Bible and our Tradition have left us as a legacy, but what the others, mainly the Catholics, are not, i.e., without a primacy, a visible expression of the Church’s unity, accompanied of course by synodality.
This year the Greek people all over the world celebrate the 200th anniversary of their independence as a sovereign state, and among the issues reflected upon was the uncanonical declaration of ecclesiastical autocephaly of the Orthodox in the liberated areas, leading to an unfortunate wave all over the Eastern Europe of uncanonical nationalistic independent Orthodox Churches.[3].
Originally thought of as the necessary step for the people’s national identity and aspirations, all Greek theologians now have come to the conclusion that we had unconsciously contributed to the heresy of ethnophyletism and nationalistic tendencies in the Orthodox Church, by leading in 1833 the series of autocephalic process. Needless to say, that all newer Orthodox autocephalies, including the earlier one of the Russian nation, especially those with Patriarchal dignity, can hardly be considered as traditional, compared with the only one ecumenically decreed in the first millennium, i.e. the Church of Cyprus, and that without patriarchal dignity! [4]
The present Ukrainian crisis has revealed and brought to the surface, yet another problem, indirectly related to primacy: Uniatism. This historical structure within the Catholic Church has been, rightly or wrongly,[5] negatively affected the progress of the bilateral dialogue in the ecumenical era between the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches. The existence of the Greek Catholic churches, historically initiated mainly in the geographic area of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, has even brought to a temporary halt the official bilateral theological dialogue between the main traditional branches of Christianity after the collapse of the Soviet rule in almost the entire Central and Eastern Europe. Today, most of us consider the Uniate Churches no longer as an obstacle, but as bridges towards Orthodox-Catholic unity.[6]
The break of the Eucharistic communion by the Patriarchate of Moscow with the Ecumenical Patriarchate – a temporary I hope and wish – is not an isolated case within Orthodoxy. Previously, the absence of ROC from the Holy and the Great Council of 2016, and their veto to the completion of the pre-conciliar document on autocephaly, was widely explained at an ideological and geopolitical level as an attempt to prevent the loss of Ukraine, something that would weaken the novel theory of the Russian leadership (political and ecclesiastical) about Russkii Mir,[7] and at a theological level because of their refusal to accept the primatial role of the Ecumenical Patriarch. I leave aside the old theory of a “Third Rome”.
The refusal to accept a Church with a visible head (a Πρώτος not in jurisdictional but in terms of a humble diaconia) actually destroys the basis of the Church’s unity. This imperative necessity of having a primus at a universal level, in view of its existence in all other levels (metropolitan, episcopal, and parish), deprives the coherence in our Church’s witness. Any novel perception of Church unity, based primarily on power, (arithmetic superiority), which is currently promoted by the Patriarchate of Moscow, or even viewed on the basis of Moscow being the capital of a currently dominant empire, as previously was the case of the Ecumenical Patriarchate at the city of New Rome, the capital of the Roman empire, can hardly have any ecclesiological, or canonical, justification. It may not be a coincidence that these views were not initially shared by Ukrainian Orthodoxy, even by the pro-Russian UOC-MP. [8]
The new situation in Ukraine with the granting of autocephaly to the Orthodox in that country [9] unexpectedly brought also a wider ecumenical revival.[10] And ironically enough with the contribution of the Uniates in religious reconciliation in Ukraine and their openly expressed views in favor of the Ukrainian autocephaly. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, for nearly half a millennium a problem in the Ukrainian/Russian history, has suddenly emerged as one the main players in fostering ecumenical relations, the way even the famous Balamand Declaration [11] for promoting the Orthodox-Catholic dialogue has failed in the past. [12]
In addition to their signing the 2014 “Memorandum of single and unified Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church,” following the announcement of the EP’s determination to grant autocephaly, in a survey under the title “What the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Can Teach Each Other,” the Ukrainian Greek Catholics did not hesitate to answer: “Broad participation in church government,” something so important in the “venerable Orthodox tradition.” And after the Ecumenical Patriarchate invited ordinary clergy and laity in addition to bishops to the December 15 unification council, they declared: “Without neglecting the conciliar tradition of the Catholic Church, the Greek-Catholic Ukrainian Church can also learn from the strong Orthodox traditions of synodality and lay participation. This applies not only to the conduct of major councils but to the election of bishops and priests,” [13] and I would add to the entire ecclesiastical life, the liturgical one included, from parish to the universal expression of it. His Beatitude Mgr. Sviatoslav (Shevchuk), underlined, that “in Ukraine, there is an interesting perspective for ecumenical dialogue in the context of new possibilities.”[14] And in an interview [15] he went as far as expressing a bold optimistic view, that “the restoration of Eucharistic communion between Rome and Constantinople is not utopian thinking, as some people call it. This is the goal of the ecumenical movement. This is the fulfillment of the commandment of Christ, ‘that all may be one’.” [16]
To conclude, we Orthodox should revisit our authentic ecclesiology with its principal expression of “unity” – and especially “catholicity” – and abandon our ideological understanding of “Orthodoxia”, mostly used against the western use of “Catholic” as their identity mark.
NOTES
[1] Cf. a critical assessment of the Constantinople-Moscow debate in cemes.weebly.com
[2] The ROC spoke of the EP’s initiative as an invasion into their own territory and an act, which may result in the major schism since 1054, even threatening that this initiative may lead to a new religious war. To most observers, the entire situation is characterized not as a schism, but as an intra-Orthodox “Ukrainian crisis”, perhaps the most serious within the family of the Orthodox Churches.
[3] See my contribution “Palingenesis-Autocephaly-Unity. A Theological Approach in View of the Ukrainian Autocephaly,” in the collective volume, E. Venizelos e. a. (eds), Εργαστήριον η Ελλάς (Lavatory Greece. Institutions and Situations that were Tested in Greece from its Palingenesis till our Present Days; Section “Greece as a Lavatory of the Autocephaly of National Orthodox Churches”, Epikentro Publishing: Thessaloniki 2021, 153-161.
[4] At this point, it is quite revealing to remind ourselves of the attempt of the Russian church to consider their Patriarchate as the fifth one, in order to replace the Old Rome in the traditional Pentarchy, and the way it was rejected.
[5] Uniatism, as the most reliable Greek Catholic scholar, and expert in Byzantine liturgy, the late Robert Taft, pointed out, “far from restoring the broken communion between East and West… led to new divisions” (“Anamnesis, Not Amnesia: The ‘Healing Memories’ and the Problem of ‘Uniatism’,” December 1, 2000 Lecture at the University of St. Michael’s College, Toronto, at www.american catholicpress.org/Father_Taft_ Anamnesis_Not_ Amnesia.html).
[6] See my “Orthodox-Catholic and Greek Catholic Relations after the Ukrainian Crisis,” in V. Latinovic-A. Wooden Stolen Churches or Bridges to Orthodoxy? Volume 2 Ecumenical and Practical Perspectives on the Orthodox and Eastern Catholic Dialogue II, Palgrave 2021, 253-267.
[7] Some analysts believe that in the back of their mind is the hegemony over all of Orthodoxy, being the continuation of, or something similar to, the earlier theory of a “Third Rome.”
[8] In addition to their earlier appeal for autocephaly, with the signature even of their current primate, Metr. Onuphry, there was also in November 2014 a “Memorandum of single and unified Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church,” signed by a number of Bishops of all the church denominations (including UOC MP and the Greek Catholic). At that period there were negotiations, supported by all of Ukraine’s Presidents, even the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich, requesting a United Orthodox Church. Almost immediately, of course, UOC MP and the Greek Catholic Bishops withdrew their signatures. As for the situation today, there can be only one explanation for the persistence of the Russian Church: Because they have lived their rivalry and controversy with the Catholic Church because of Uniatism, they continue even in the era of universal reconciliation to consider themselves the guardians of the authentic (Orthodox) Christian faith, and Greek Orthodoxy under the Ecumenical Patriarchate, not only fallen into…Uniatism, but also too tolerant and quite open to the ecumenical dialogue. It is no coincidence that the Russkii Mir narrative has as its constituent element the confrontation with the “corrupted” West, to which Greek Orthodoxy also indirectly belongs. Being an advocate of the unity of the Orthodox Church, as of course of the entire Church of Christ, although I completely disagree with these views, both for missiological and for theological reasons, I believe that a genuine and sincere dialogue with the Russian views is necessary more than ever. And to this end we have initiated a series of practical measures to heal the existing enmity between autocephalists and Russophiles of Ukraine.
[9] This is rejected not only by the Moscow Patriarchate but also by the community in Ukraine affiliated to it (UOC-MP), a community that demographically is heavily declining after the war in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea.
[10] Obviously, this paper exclusively focuses on the present situation, after the decision of the EP to grand autocephaly to the Church of Ukraine. For the origins of Uniatism the reader can consult the most reliable treatment on the issue, written by a Russian historian and theologian (of Ukrainian origin, born in Odessa), G. Florovsky. He started his chapter on “Uniatism” in the second part of his “Ways of Russian Theology,” with the following accurate assessment: “The Unia was less an act of religious choice than cultural and political self-determination. Neither reasons of faith nor of doctrine were fundamental to the secession of the bishops. The early Uniates were quite sincere in contending that ‘they did not change the faith.’ They felt they were only transferring jurisdictions and seem really to have believed that the ‘Latin faith’ and the ‘Greek faith’ were identical.” (http://www.holytrinitymission.org/ books/english/ way_russian_theology_florovsky.htm#).
[11] The thorny issue of Uniatism for Orthodox-Catholic relations was clearly demonstrated as such by the rejection of a perfectly drafted document by the Joint International Commission for Theological Dialogue Between the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches during its 7th plenary session, held in 1993 at the Balamand School of Theology in Lebanon. This document, entitled “Uniatism, method of union of the past, and the present search for full communion,” was written in the hope to smoothen the tensions that had arisen between Eastern (and Oriental) Orthodox Churches and their Catholic counterparts in different countries, but most evidently in Ukraine after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The document thoroughly discussed ecclesiological principles and suggested practical rules for both the Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox Churches, in an attempt to improve their relations by reciprocally avoiding interfering in each other’s affairs and not using history in a polemical manner. According to Cardinal Edward Cassidy, the Catholic co-chairman of the Commission at that period, the report contained three principles: that individuals have the freedom to follow their conscience, that Eastern Catholic Churches have the right to exist, and that Uniatism is not the current method of full communion. The two further points of the declarations were that the Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Churches are “sister churches” and that rebaptism should be avoided.
[12] The Eastern Orthodox rejected the Balamand Declaration, because it did not call for the abolition of the Uniate Churches, while most of the Greek or Eastern Catholics rejected it, “because it seemed to imply, they should never have existed.” Of course, the Orthodox were always demanding within the framework of the official theological dialogue and beyond that the Eastern Catholic Churches, considered as the Trojan Horse to proselytism, should either return to the Orthodox Church or be fully absorbed by the Catholic Church without following the Eastern rite. That demand was regularly put forward in recent years by the ROC, insisting that the “problem of Uniatism” should be solved before any substantial progress can be made in the Orthodox-Catholic dialogue. And that was the reason of the temporary break of the official bilateral dialogue for nearly a decade, only to start again with another disagreement by the Russians, this time on the “Ravenna Document.” This time it was a disagreement on the importance of primacy, basically for having a different understanding of the primacy of the Ecumenical Patriarch, always avoiding to call him this way using instead the title Patriarch of Constantinople, with consequences also for the progress of the Catholic-Orthodox theological dialogue. A notable exception on this issue was the reaction of the Ukrainian Eastern Catholic Church, the head of which, His Beatitude Myroslav Ivan Lubachivsky, welcomed the Balamand Declaration. In a letter to Cardinal Edward Cassidy, he said: “I commit myself, my brother bishops, clergy, and faithful to applying the practical rules of the Balamand Document to the best of our ability”.
[13] https://Risu.org.ua/en/index/expert_thought/authors_ columns/asorokowski_column/74140/
[14] http://news.ugcc.ua/en/photo/the_leaders_of_the_ugcc_ and_the_ocu_spoke_in_favor_of_ deepening_the_cooperation_ between_the_churches_85095.html.
[15] https://glavcom. ua/country/society/blazhennishiy-svyatoslav-jednannya-katolikiv-i-pravoslavnih-ne-je-utopijeyu-559594.html. This brought the immediate reaction by the friendly to the Moscow Patriarchate western Orthodox site http://orthochristian.com/118536.html.
[16] Also, from his interview in glavcom.ua, in the above note.
